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Regulating Corporate Directors’ Pay and Performance: A Comparative Review 
Elimma C. Ezeani and Elizabeth Williams ⃰ 
 
Abstract  
This paper looks at the practice and reform with regard to directors’ pay and 
performance in Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and Nigeria. It examines the use 
and impact of incentive plans, Long Term, Short term, and Performance-Related, in 
compensating directors. Although all three jurisdictions can benefit from further 
reforms, this work finds that Australia’s strong oversight of directors’ pay and 
performance provide a more robust corporate governance strategy than the other two 
jurisdictions. It also argues that contrary to the UK non-interventionist approach, 
without a robust regime for addressing directors’ pay, the chances of corporate failure 
are increasingly greater. Emerging economies like Nigeria need even stronger oversight 
to attract much needed investment and maintain confidence in the Nigerian corporate 
sector.  
Key words: directors, performance, pay, reform, compensation, corporate governance 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The collapse of banks and businesses in 2008 highlighted the failure of corporate 
management to prevent inherent risks in financial transactions.1 Despite this failure in 
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1See generally, Adrian Blundell-Wignall, Paul Atkinson and Se Hoon Lee, “ The Current Financial 
Crisis: Causes and Policy Issues” Financial Market Trends OECD (2009);  Grant Kirkpatrick, “The 
Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis” Financial Market Trends OECD (2008); 
David H. Erkens, Mingyi Hung, Pedro Matos, “Corporate Governance in the 2007-2008 financial crisis: 
Evidence from financial institutions worldwide”, Journal of Corporate Finance Vol 18 Issue 2 (April 
2012) 389-411; C. Meintjes and A. F. Grobler, ‘Do public relations professionals understand corporate 
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risk management2 it seemed as if directors would retain large compensations and pay-
outs without any obligation to return or pay back the monies lost under their watch.3 
Directors’ remuneration structures have therefore come under greater scrutiny. 
Remuneration is important because to attract, retain and promote successful corporate 
activity, management talent must be incentivised and compensated appropriately. Good 
corporate governance (CG) expects that a Board when considering executive pay, must 
take cognisance of the challenges in the tasks executed by directors.4 The question is 
whether directors’ performance always measures up to their often hefty remuneration 
packages? There is strong evidence that inappropriate incentive structures played a role 
in the 2008 crisis.5  
Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and Nigeria provide good bases to assess efforts 
at balancing directors’ remuneration with performance. The three jurisdictions share 
common-law foundations. Nigeria is a fast expanding hub of corporate activity in the 
African continent, it will provide some insight into the challenges emerging markets 
face in adopting strategies on executive remuneration. The UK has made significant 
effort in encouraging good corporate governance through domestic regulation6 and the 
                                      
governance issues well enough to advise companies on stakeholder relationship management’, Public 
Relations Review (2013) 161-170. 
2Grant Kirkpatrick, op cit, 1. 
3Clive Boddy, ‘The Corporate Psychopaths Theory of the Global Financial Crisis’, (2011) 102 Journal 
of Business Ethics 255. 
4The OECD, Corporate Governance Board Practices Incentives and Governing Risks, paragraph 2.4 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081438.pdf accessed 9 February 2015. 
5Paul Gregg, Sarah Jewell and Ian Tonks, ‘Executive Pay and Performance: Did Bankers’ Bonuses Cause 
the Crisis’, (2011) 12 (1) International Review of Finance 89. See also, Eilís Ferran et al, The Regulatory 
Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis Cambridge Uni. Press (2012). 
6Brian R Cheffins, ‘History and the Global Corporate Governance Revolution: The UK Perspective’, 
(2001) 43(4) Business History 87 available at 
 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/713999243 accessed 9 February 2015. 
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high performance of companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) suggest 
Australia is a “poster-child” for financial and CG reforms.7  
The definition of corporate governance differs depending on one’s perspective.8  
However the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
states as follows:  
Corporate Governance involves a set of relationships between a 
company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  Corporate Governance also provides the structure 
through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means 
of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined.9 
The Cadbury Report in the UK defined CG as “…the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled.”10 The Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission11 (ASIC) definition is broken down into two parts. It states that: 
Firstly, it is about the mechanisms by which corporations are 
directed and controlled; and Secondly, it is about the mechanisms 
by which those who direct and control the corporation are monitored 
                                      
7Jayalakshmy Ramachandran, Ramaiyer Subramanian and Liew Tze Yeen, ‘Do corporate governance 
practices differ among countries?’ Available at: 
 http://www.academia.edu/4424998/Do_Corporate_Governance_Practises_Differ_Among_Countries  
accessed 1 April 2017. 
8Stuart L. Gillan, ‘Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview’ (2006) 12(3) Journal 
of Corporate Finance 381-402 at 381. 
9OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf accessed 9th February 2015. 
10Sir Adrian Cadbury chairing the Cadbury Committee on corporate governance in 1992 available at: 
http://www.ecorporate governancei.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf accessed 9th February 2015. 
11Supervisory and regulatory body created by the Australian Securities and Investment Commission Act 
No. 51 of 2001 (as amended). 
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and supervised. That is, it is about mechanisms that ensure those 
who are in control are accountable.12 
Earlier scholars have also made attempts to define CG.13 Whether theoretical 
definitions match what obtains in practice today is open to debate, as Bloomfield 
contends that:  
much of what currently passes for the theory of corporate governance and which 
forms the foundation of regulatory policy is based on a description of forces, 
relationships and actors that holds very little similarity to the way that the real 
world operates. 14 
An aspect of CG which has attracted the attention of regulatory policy is the issue of 
directors’ or executive remuneration or compensation.15 Executive compensation is a 
key part of CG because it determines the incentives of the directors not only as to size 
but also to the structure of such compensation package.16 The compensation package 
may consist of all or some of the following components: short term base salary and 
annual bonus; and long-term stock and stock options, insurance, pension benefits and 
severance pay.17 For reasons of transparency and accountability there is a need for 
                                      
12Berna Collier, Commissioner of ASIC at the Corporate Governance Summit 2002 paper titled ‘The 
Role of ASIC in corporate governance’ available at: https://www.asic.gov.au  accessed 9th February 
2015. 
13 See for example, Andrei Schleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 
52(2) The Journal of Finance 737-783 at 737; Stuart Gillan and Laura T. Starks, ‘A Survey of 
Shareholder Activism: Motivation and Empirical Evidence’, (1998) 2(3) Contemporary Finance Digest 
10; Stuart Gillan and Laura T. Starks, ‘Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of 
Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective’, (2003) 13(2) Journal of Applied Finance 4.                       
14 See Stephen Bloomfield, Theory and Practice of Corporate Governance: An Integrated 
Approach (2013) Cambridge University Press, xiii. 
15In this article, the words director or executive are used interchangeably. Compensation and 
Remuneration are also used interchangeably in reference to directors’ pay. 
16Stephen Sapp, ‘The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation’, (2008) 14(4) 
European Journal of Management 710 
17Marc Goergen and Luc Renneboog, ‘Managerial compensation’, (2011) 17(4) Journal of Corporate 
Finance 1068. See also Konstantinos Stathopoulos et al, ‘U.K. Executive Compensation Practices: New 
Economy versus Old Economy’, (2004) 16(1) Journal of Management Accounting Research 57 
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companies to adopt proper compensation schemes and where (improper) schemes such 
as the “Golden Handshake”, are used, to have mechanisms for reclaiming these 
compensation packages via “claw back polices”.  
Section II examines compensation schemes and processes to claw back improper 
compensation. Section III analyses the different forms of incentive plans, while Section 
IV considers the broad issue of directors’ remuneration and reforms. Section V 
evaluates the challenges in measuring performance for remuneration purposes. The 
paper concludes in section VI. 
II. COMPENSATION SCHEMES  
Compensation plays a key role in motivating directors to ensure their efficient 
monitoring of management and to produce high standards of performance of the 
company.18 If the key objective of CG is to ensure the sustainability and performance 
of a company in line with the interest of its stakeholders, it is only reasonable that 
directors’ compensation packages should be sufficient stimulus for those who are to 
pursue this objective. We agree that the performance of a company is hinged on its 
compensation environment as per the size of pay, 19 and that compensation has to be 
appropriately designed if it is to motivate directors towards effective leadership and 
governance.20 
                                      
18Tod Perry, ‘Incentive Compensation for Outside Directors and CEO Turnover’, (June 2000) Paper 
presented at Tuck-JFE Contemporary Corporate Governance Conference available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236033 accessed 9th February 2015. 
19Jeff Koza and Claude Boulanger, ‘Managing the complex relationship between executive pay and 
performance’, (2004) 6 Ivey Business Journal available at 
http://iveybusinessjournal.com/topics/governance/managing-the-complex-relationship-between-
executive-pay-and-performance#.Uz6Qh7SFdRU accessed 9th February 2015. 
20Australian Government Productivity Commission, ‘Executive Remuneration in Australia’ Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report No. 49, 19 December 2009 available at: http://www.afr.com/rw/2009-
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Therefore in determining executive compensation, regard has to be given to the various 
stakeholders of the company.21 In addition, the size of the board, the size of the 
company, familiarity between the members of the board, the managers and the major 
shareholders, the attraction and retention of executives are all contributory factors in 
the determination of an appropriate compensation scheme.22 From the results of 
interviews carried out by Bender and Moir, there must be a balance between the affected 
parties as regards the compensation scheme of the executives.23 Those who determine 
directors’ compensation have to make fair considerations as to the interests of others 
given that the executive is paid from the residual profit of the company and excessive 
compensation reduces the profit of the company.24It appears that there is no generally 
accepted way of determining the appropriateness of executive compensation.25 In 
practice, the market in which the company finds itself is used as a benchmark in 
determining executive pay and its levels of bonus and long term awards.26  
For example, the Nigerian corporate environment mainly comprises private, single-
leader companies run by heads of families, or friends and business remains largely cash-
driven. There has been little external influence on the internal activities of companies 
by government regulation or reform and “share options and bonuses are not usually part 
                                      
2014/AFR/2010/01/27/Photos/291f10c8-0b02-11df-9175-33c750d86f9c_executive-remuneration-
report.pdf  accessed 13th February 2015 
21 This will include the other members of the Board, shareholders, employees, other officers of the 
company, and some other stakeholders including the opinion of regulatory bodies where applicable. 
22Nat Ofo, ‘Eight Engaging Issues for Directors of Listed Companies in Nigeria in 2013’ The Corporate 
Prof (11 January, 2013) available at http://thecorporateprof.com/eight-engaging-issues-for-directors-of-
listed-companies-in-nigeria-in-2013/ accessed 9th February 2015 
23Ruth Bender and Lance Moir, ‘Does ‘Best Practice’ in Setting Executive Pay in the UK Encourage 
‘Good’ Behaviour?’, (2006) 67 Journal of Business Ethics 75. 
24Ibid, 81. 
25 Ruth Bender, ‘How Executive Directors’ Remuneration is Determined in Two FTSE 350 Utilities’, 
(2003) 11(3) Corporate Governance: An International Review 206 
26Ibid. 
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of non-executive compensation package in Nigeria.”27 Since businesses rely heavily on 
cash transactions directors are not too interested in non-liquid compensation packages 
such as LTIPs (Long Term Investment Plans) in the form of share options and other 
forms of equity. To some scholars, the environment provides room for greed and 
fraud.28   
Weak regulatory and enforcement mechanisms and the relatively mild punishment that 
has accompanied previous corporate scandals in the country are also important factors. 
29 Disinterest or lack of informed awareness of shareholders also mean that they exert 
little control over directors’ activities. A nascent corporate culture and lack of 
management expertise by directors as to proper board processes and conduct may also 
be a contributory factor in malpractices related to remuneration.30 
In Australia, paying reasonable remuneration to directors of a company is an exception 
to the rule requiring shareholders’ approval for payment of financial benefits to a related 
third party under the Australian Corporations Law.31 The Australian Institute of 
                                      
27Chris Ogbechie and Dimitrious N Koufopoulos, “Corporate Governance Practices in Nigeria” in 
SabriBoubaker and DucKhong Nguyen (eds) Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets: Theories, 
Practices and Cases 373-394 at 388.  
28 See S.C. Okaro, G.O. Okafor and G. Ofoegbu, ‘Corporate Fraud in Nigeria- A Two Case Study’,) 
International Journal of Research in Management (2013) 3:16, 9. 
29See further, Joseph E. Abugu, ‘Monitoring directors’ remuneration, fat cat packages and perks of 
office’,  (2012) 19(1) Journal of Financial Crime 6; Kunle Aina, “Board of directors and corporate 
governance in Nigeria,” International Journal of Business and Finance Management Research BluePen 
Journals (2013) 21-34;  Chris Ogbechie and Dimitrious N Koufopoulos, op cit, at 387-8; John Adeleke, 
‘Africa’s re-development needs: a Nigerian perspective’ openDemocracy(UK, 8 July 2005) available at 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-G8/nigeria_2660.jsp accessed 9th February 2015; 
Veracity, ‘Nigeria’s Own Enrons’ (Nigerian Politics, 18 December 2006), available at 
http://nigerianpolity.blogspot.co.uk/2006/12/nigerias-own-enrons_18.html accessed 9th February 2015. 
30 See the study by Christopher I Ogbechie, Key Determinants of Effective Boards of Directors – 
Evidence from Nigeria (PhD Thesis submission) Brunel University UK (2012) pp 193-4.   
31 Section 243Q Australian Corporations Law 1994; where remuneration (emoluments) are excessive, it 
may however attract civil sanction under S264 AA of the Corporations Law. See further Janine Pascoe, 
“Regulation and Disclosure of Financial Benefits to Directors and Related Parties: A Comparative 
Analysis of the Malaysian and Australian Approaches” Singapore Journal of International and 
Comparative Law (1999) 3 108-133 at 114; Cf, Kym Sheehan, “The Regulatory Framework for 
Executive Remuneration in Australia” Sydney Law Review Vol 31 (2009)  273-308; Roman Tomasic, 
Stephen Bottomley, Rob McQueen, Corporations Law in Australia Federation Press (2002) at 275-6. 
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Directors notes that compensation of directors should remain reasonable for the 
company and directors with the board deciding what is reasonable.32 Also in Australia, 
special payments above salary entitlements paid to executives in cases such as 
retirement, the end of a contract, retrenchment or redundancy were collectively 
regarded as a “golden handshake”.33 The benefits accruing from these packages are 
significant.34 For instance, five senior executives of the AMP Insurance Holdings Pty 
Ltd who were responsible for one of Australia’s largest ever corporate losses were 
rewarded over $AU 12 million and the CEO of Southcorp Keith Lambert got $AU4.4 
million even though during his tenure the company’s shares lost 40 per cent of their 
value.35 In 2009 the Australian government introduced the new golden-handshake law 
under which shareholders’ approval is required for ‘golden handshakes’.36 The 
government has also used tax policies as a tool in clamping down on golden 
                                      
32Australian Institute of Directors, Remuneration Committees: Good Practice Guide, (AICD, 2006) 
33John Wasiliev, ‘Golden hand shake-up’ The Australian Financial Review (Australia, 12 May 2012) 
available at 
http://www.afr.com/p/personal_finance/smart_money/golden_hand_shake_up_mm86MxTujwrpAxGC
N7hGZI accessed 9th February 2015. 
34 See Rachel Rickard Straus, ‘Reward for failure: Britain’s disgraced former bankers set to share £104 
Million pension pot’ Thisismoney (United Kingdom, 12 November 2012) available at 
http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/news/article-2231774/Reward-failure-Britains-disgraced-
bankers-set-share-104-MILLION-pension-pot.html accessed 9th February 2015, commenting on the 
Royal Bank of Scotland failure; Jessica Corsi, ‘Reward for failure’, HR Magazine (19 June 2013) 
available at http://www.hrmagazine.co.uk/hro/features/1077524/reward-failure accessed 16th  February 
2015 commenting on the failure of Wire and Plastics Product Group. See also, Steve Slater and Chris 
Vellacott, ‘Barclays executive pay-off slammed as “reward for failure”’ Reuters (UK, 26th July 2012) 
criticising the pay to Jerry del Messier quit as the Chief Operating Officer after Barclay’s bank had been 
fined the sum of $450 million for manipulating Libor interest rates.  Available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/uk-banking-libor-barclays-idUKBRE86P18P20120726 
accessed 9th February 2015.                                                                                                                                                             
35John Shields, Michael O’Donnell and John O’Brien, ‘The Bucks Stop Here: Private Sector Executive 
Remuneration in Australia’, Report prepared for the  Labour Council of New South Wales available at 
http://www.cufa.com.au/downloads/library/csr/The_Buck_Stops_here.pdf accessed 9th February 2015 
36Paul Nyakazeya, ‘Golden Handshakes Fuelling Corruption-Analysts’, The Standard (Zimbabwe, 3 
December 2009) available at http://www.thestandard.co.zw/2009/12/03/golden-handshakes-fuelling-
corruption-analysts/ accessed 9th February 2015. 
9 
 
handshakes; any part of a compensation or golden handshake which takes the overall 
taxable income to $180,000 will be taxed at the normal marginal tax rate.37 
A. Reclaiming improper compensation: Claw back policies 
Pauline Renaud has suggested that companies should include clawback clauses or 
policies in their remuneration policies in the fight to curb reward for failure.38 For this 
to work, it has to be proved that the executive has misbehaved or there is material error 
or; the company has suffered or is suffering a material downturn of performance or; the 
company suffers a material failure of risk management. In any of these circumstances, 
the Bank of England proposes that bankers will be forced to give back cash for up to 
six years after they have received or spent it.39 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) 
came up with a consultation paper on reforming the UK CG Code and of the three issues 
from which feedbacks were expected one was the issue of clawback policies. The Bank 
of England and the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA) have also issued a 
consultation paper which contains a recommendation that the Remuneration Code 
should contain a requirement for all PRA authorised companies or banks to amend 
employment contract to enable companies’ claw back remuneration when it is the right 
thing to do.40 The RBS Group Plc after the Libor scandal recovered about £302 million 
                                      
37Jeff Whaley, ‘Clamping down on golden handshakes’ Herald Sun News (Australia, 9 May 2012) 
vailable at http://www.heraldsun.com.au/ipad/clamping-down-on-golden-handshakes/story-fn6bn4mv-
1226350429357 accessed 9th February 2015. 
38Pauline Renaud, ‘Clawback Provisions in Executive Compensation Contracts’ Financier Worldwide 
(January 2009) available at http://www.financierworldwide.com/article.php?id=2978 accessed 5th April 
2014. 
39James Barty and Ben Jones, ‘Executive Compensation: Rewards for success not failure’, Policy 
Exchange (UK, 04 July 2012) available at 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/executive%20compensation.pdf accessed 9th 
February 2015. 
40Aredhel Johnson and Bernhard Gilbey, ‘Clawback: The Bank of England Seeks to Avoid First-mover 
Disadvantage’ Squire Sanders (UK, 21 March 2014) available at 
http://www.globalcompensationinsights.com/2014/03/clawback-the-bank-of-england-seeks-to-avoid-
first-mover-disadvantage/ accessed 9th February 2015. 
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by cutting its bonus pools and reclaiming compensation. It appears that the position of 
the UK is that it would rather claw back compensations made as a result of failure than 
cap executive pay.41 
In Australia, the government’s legislation has a dual policy on compensation. First, 
companies are required to disclose the pay package of executives and second, 
companies are required to ensure that bonuses can be clawed back in situations where 
the financial existence of the company have been falsified.42 The Australian 
government in 2012 released a draft legislation following the Productivity Commission 
2009 Report on Executive Remuneration amending the already existing disclosure laws 
on compensation. One of the new requirements is that companies will have to make 
disclosures on claw backs, actual termination payments, payments post termination, 
and past present and future pay.43 The resulting legislation, the Corporations 
Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Act 
2011 (Act 42 of 2011) introduced a “two-strikes” rule  - where shareholders vote against 
a remuneration report at two consecutive AGMs, the  company is required by law to 
put a motion before the shareholders to “say-on-pay” i.e. vote on re-election of the 
Board.44 There are continued doubts about whether this law will actually curb excessive 
                                      
41Bloomberg News, ‘England’s Central Bank proposes bonus clawbacks for naughty bankers’, Financial 
Post (UK, 13 March 2014) available at http://business.financialpost.com/2014/03/13/englands-central-
bank-proposes-bonus-clawbacks-for-naughty-bankers/ accessed 9th February 2015. 
42Myriam Robin, ‘Beware the clawbacks: govt to legislate on executive pay’, Crikey (Australia, 27 
November, 2012) available at http://www.crikey.com.au/2012/11/27/beware-the-clawbacks-govt-to-
legislate-on-executive-pay/ accessed 9th February 2015. 
43 Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) (The Boardroom Report), ‘Executive pay laws in 
for further shake-up’, AICD (2013) 11(1) available at http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-
Resource-Centre/Publications/The-Boardroom-Report/Back-Volumes/Volume-11-2013/Volume-11-
Issue-1/Directors-pay-up accessed 9th February 2015. 
44 See Julie Walker, “Australia Has Had Three Years With The Two-strikes Law and Executive Pay Pain 
Won’t Go Away” Business Insider Australia, available at http://www.businessinsider.com.au/australia-
has-had-three-years-with-the-two-strikes-law-and-executive-pay-pain-wont-go-away-2013-10 accessed 
9th February 2015. 
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executive remuneration although it appears to have improved Board-Shareholder 
information.45 While it appears in different guises, the say on pay concept is not limited 
to Australia – the UK’S FCA Remuneration Code also proposes a similar shareholder 
approval for directors’ remuneration although the Board retains the responsibility for 
determining the remuneration.46 
There is no similar provision on recovering improper compensation in the Nigerian 
jurisdiction. Altogether, the fact that the available Codes on corporate governance in 
the country47 are, “silent on remuneration” and that shareholder acquiescence at 
directors’ suggestions for remuneration in general meetings is “expected” leaves little 
room for doubt about the freehand which directors have in determining their 
remuneration. 48 However while there is no claw back policy in Nigeria there has been 
a claw back attempt under a discretionary policy initiated in 2009 by the Central Bank 
of Nigeria following its independent investigation of a number of banks in the country 
on grounds of banking reform. Although it allowed the then Central Bank Governor to 
controversially and unilaterally, arrest bank directors, replace them with hand-picked 
new ones, and prosecute the arrested directors for return of monies alleged to have been 
fraudulently taken from the banks.49 
 
                                      
45 Ibid. 
46See the FCA web page “Remuneration Codes” available at http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-
regulated/remuneration-codes accessed 9th February 2015.  
47These are: the (voluntary) Code of Best Practices for Public Companies by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission 2006; the (mandatory) Code of Corporate Governance for Banks operating in Nigeria by 
the Central Bank of Nigeria (2006); and the (mandatory) Code of Good Corporate Governance for the 
Insurance Industry by the National Insurance Commission (2009).    
48See Chris Ogbechie and Dimitrious N Koufopoulos, op cit, 388. 
49See also, Chinedu Bosah, ‘Bail out the poor, not the fat cats’ The Vanguard (Nigeria, 3 November 
2009) available at http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/11/bail-out-the-poor-not-the-fat-cats/ accessed 9th 
February 2015. 
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III. INCENTIVES  
In the UK, executive compensation is typically comprised of base salary, annual bonus 
element and long term pay which consists of share options and LTIPs.50 Since the UK 
requires detailed disclosure on executive compensation practices, it is perhaps more 
probable that the disclosed pay of the directors is determined based on the performance 
of the company.51 Nevertheless as a response to the culture of rewarding poor or bad 
performance, the EU parliament came up with a resolution to fix a bonus cap which 
aims to put a lid on annual performance related bonuses of executive.52 The bonus cap 
will make changes to the way remuneration is structured, that is, from salary annual 
bonus and LTIP, to schemes that are expected to comprise salaries, share allowances 
and bonuses.53The UK government has so far resisted this cap on the argument that in 
the UK at least, executives are rewarded for success.54 In order to circumvent the EU 
bonus cap which limits bonuses to 100 per cent of annual salaries or 200 per cent with 
shareholder approval, financial executives get more share payments as remuneration.55 
                                      
50Martin Conyon, Simon Peck, Laura Read and Graham Sadler, ‘The Structure of Executive 
Compensation Contracts: UK Evidence’, (2000) 33(4) Long Range Planning 478. 
51Martin Conyon and Kevin Murphy, ‘The Prince and the Pauper? CEO pay in the United States and 
United Kingdom’, (2002) 110(467) The Economic Journal 640 at 644. See also Martin J. Conyon and 
Graham V. Sadler, ‘Executive pay, tournaments and corporate performance in UK firms’, (2003) 3(2) 
International Journal of Management Reviews 141. 
52Sharon Bowles, ‘Bankers’ bonuses are here to stay until a change of culture occurs’ The Guardian 
(London, 4 March 2014) available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/mar/04/bankers-
bonuses-change-culture-eu-bonus-cap accessed 9th February 2015. 
53Jill Treanor, ‘Britain’s bank bosses to get millions in share payments in bonus cap dodge’ The Guardian 
(London, 21 February 2014) 
54Polly Toynbee, ‘The push for performance-related pay is driven by faith, not facts’ The Guardian 
(London, 12 November 2013) available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/12/performance-related-pay-risky-behaviour 
accessed 9th February 2015; See also Jon Jachimowicz, ‘Using Insights From Behavioural Economics to 
Redesign Executive Compensation’, The Huffington Post (UK, 24 October 2013) available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/jon-jachimowicz/executive-compensation_b_4148812.html 
accessed 9th February 2015. 
55The BBC, ‘Lloyds and Barclays avoid EU bonus cap by paying shares’, BBC News Business (UK, 5 
March 2014) available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26453390 accessed 9th February 2015. 
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With UK’s exit (Brexit) from the EU following the 2016 referendum, the impact of 
further EU proposals is debatable. 
 In Australia, the issue of executive directors’ pay has received the interest of both the 
Australian public and the policy makers including the ASX.56 The level of pay and the 
relationship of pay to performance have also come under scrutiny.57 The ASX 
recommends that a relationship between remuneration and performance should be 
created and aligned and also be clearly disclosed to investors.58 This suggests that in 
Australia there is a recognised link between remuneration and performance however 
Merhebi et al find that contrary to international evidence which suggests that executive 
pay is significantly correlated with company performance, the Australian situation is 
that the performance of companies is inconsistent with the pay of executives.59 
In Nigeria, Obatan opines that executives of companies can only be motivated to work 
through financial incentives because by the nature of their positions, they are not 
promoted or promotable and therefore look to incentives to perform.60 This suggests 
that motivation by incentives is fundamental to performance. One is not sure whether 
this is the case. So long as the company remains a going concern whether or not it 
makes losses consecutively or performs poorly compared to previous reports, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the director in the Nigerian jurisdiction will lose any agreed 
                                      
56Hristos Doucouliagos, Janto Haman and Saeed Askray, ‘Directors’ Remuneration and Performance in 
Australian Banking’, (2007) 15(6) Corporate Governance: An International Review 1363; see also 
Glennis Hanley and Loan Nguyen, ‘Right on the Money: What do Australian Unions think of 
performance-related pay?’, (2005) 27(2) Employee Relations 141; Robert Dransfield, Human Resource 
Management, (Heinemann, 2000)  
57Rachel Merhebi, et al., ‘Australian chief executive officer remuneration: pay and performance’, (2006) 
46(3) Accounting and Finance 481 
58ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 2014, Recommendation 8 
59Rachel Merhebi, et al., op cit.  
60Kehinde Obasan, ‘Effect of Compensation Strategy on Corporate Performance: Evidence from 
Nigerian Firms’, (2012) 3(7) Research Journal of Finance and Accounting 37. 
14 
 
compensation, be stripped of any personal awards or even be subject to a review of the 
agreed remuneration package.  
Part of the difficulty in assessing directors’ remuneration is the complexities in the 
various means by which directors are rewarded, not least by incentive plans. These 
incentive plans are: Long term; Short term; and the more general if ambiguous 
Performance Related Incentives (PRIs). While Short-term incentive plans (STIPs) are 
more common than LTIPs,61 they are not necessarily applied the same way across all 
three jurisdictions. However, the time frame of one-accounting year used in setting out 
the performance targets on which these incentive plans are based,62 is common to all 
three. 
A. Long Term Incentive Plans (LTIPs) 
One of the advantages of LTIPs is that it provides a direct link between performance 
and executive pay.63 LTIPs are awarded to executives both as an incentive to improve 
performance and in order to reduce fixed costs. They include: share option plans and 
bonuses linked to long term performance.64 In Australia, there has been a shift in the 
mix of executive pay structure from fixed salary to LTIPs and STIPs.65 One such shift 
                                      
61M. Brown  and J. Heywood  ‘Paying for Performance. What Has Been Learned?’ in M. Brown and J. 
Heywood (eds) Paying for Performance. An International Comparison (Armonk NY, 2002) 261 
62Piotr Urbanek, ‘CEOs Remuneration in Corporate Governance Codes in EU Member Countries’,(2009) 
(12)1-2 Comparative Economic Research, 45 available at 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/cer.2009.12.issue-1-2/v10103-009-0004-9/v10103-009-0004-9.xml 
accessed 9th February 2015. 
63Marc Goergen and Luc Renneboog, ‘Managerial Compensation’ (2011) 17(4) Journal of Corporate 
Finance 1068. 
64Sriyan de Silva, ‘An Introduction to Performance and Skill-Based Systems’, International Labour 
Organization ACT/EMP Publications available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/downloads/publications/srspaysy.pdf accessed 9th 
February 2015. 
65 See generally Graham O’Neill and Allan Berry, ‘Remuneration of Australian executives: A 
practitioner review’, (2002) 40(2) Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 228-245. 
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happened when in 2012 the shareholders of National Australia Bank voted on whether 
the CEO will be awarded a sum more than $2.7 million if he can take the company into 
the top quarter of its peer group by 2016. This fixation of pay with performance by 
demanding that the director achieve a set goal is a major reason why LTIPs have 
become increasingly popular in Australia.66 In 2010, the three most influential 
companies in Australia structured their remuneration plans to be more shareholder 
friendly. The Commonwealth Bank, Argo Investments and BHP Billiton have increased 
and now calculate their LTIPs both for four years and five years respectively indicating 
that LTIPs are shareholder-friendly and are welcomed.67 
In addition, the Australian Institute of Company Directors has created guidelines for 
executive share and option scheme deadlines (LTIPs). It recommends that there should 
be a reasonable structure for incentive schemes designed around appropriate 
performance benchmarks that measure performance and provide rewards that will 
improve the company’s future performance.68 Despite the fact that it is becoming 
popular, this approach to determining LTIPs has been criticised on the basis that 
companies will need to consider the peculiar nature of their business operations or 
                                      
66Myriam Robin, ‘NAB’s $4 million carrot: How to use long-term incentives to improve performance’, 
Smart Company (Australia, 13 November 2012) available at 
http://www.smartcompany.com.au/leadership/management/39047-nabs-4-million-carrot-how-to-use-
long-term-incentives-to-improve-performance-.html?limitstart=0 accessed 9th February 2015. 
67Stuart Wilson, ‘Companies see value of long-term thinking: long-term incentives’, The Australian 
(Australia, 20 October 2010) available at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/companies-see-
value-of-long-term-thinking-long-term-incentives/story-e6frg8zx-1225940897061 accessed 9th 
February 2015. 
68AICD, ‘Executive Share and Option Scheme Guidelines’, (Director Resource Centre, 2007) available 
at http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Policy-on-director-issues/Policy-
Papers/2000/Executive-Share-and-Option-Scheme-Guidelines accessed 9 February 2015. 
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industry and not just adopt a standard model which may not suit their operational 
purposes.69 
The UK’s Financial Service Authority (FSA) Code70 on remuneration has eight major 
principles which are aimed at avoiding incentive structures that encourage decisions 
based on short-term basis but rather to encourage incentive structures that take into 
account long-term effects.71 The scope of the Code covers all aspects of remuneration 
including wages, bonus, LTIPs, options, severance packages and pension.72 While 
LTIPs are not yet hugely popular in the UK, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
Principles of Remuneration, 201373 attaching importance to both STIPs and LTIPs, 
have nevertheless recommended that LTIPs are important in remuneration structures 
and should be considered for long term strategies.74 The reason for their unpopularity 
in the UK may be that LTIPs can be manipulated by the executive in their favour and 
setting them usually entails setting a complex standard and choice of performance 
hurdle.75 Problems begin when a company's long-term incentives are sacrificed for the 
                                      
69Gareth Hutchens, ‘Bosses incentive schemes guided by herd mentality’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Australia, 12 January, 2013) available at http://www.smh.com.au/business/bosses-incentive-schemes-
guided-by-herd-mentality-20130111-2clln.html accessed 9th February 2015; See also the comments of 
Edward Beale CEO, Citi Group who has criticised the UK approach  as being a one-size-fits-all standard 
for LTIPs, in  Gavin Hinks, ‘Discounting the future: The furore over long-term incentive plans’, 
Financial Director (UK, 16 January 2014) available at http://www.financialdirector.co.uk/financial-
director/feature/2320345/discounting-the-future-the-furore-over-long-term-incentive-plans accessed 9th 
February 2015. 
70The Remuneration Code of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) published 12 August 2009, in force 
1 January 2010, and FSA Handbook's Principles for Business and Senior Management Arrangements, 
Systems and Controls sourcebook (SYSC). 
71Yannick Hausemann and Elisabeth Bechtold-Orth, ‘Changing remuneration systems in Europe and the 
United States: a legal analysis of recent developments in the wake of the financial crisis’, (2010) 11(2) 
European Business Organization Law Review 195. 
72See Anu Arora, ‘Remuneration Practices in Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Part 2’, (2012)  
33(5) Company Lawyer 131.  
73Association of British Insurers Principles of Remuneration issued 5th November 2013 available at 
https://www.ivis.co.uk/media/5887/ABI-Principles-of-Remuneration-2013-final.pdf accessed 9th 
February 2015. 
74ABI Principles on Remuneration, 2013 sections B and C (2). 
75Trevor Buck, Alistair Bruce, Brian G. M. Main and Henry Udueni, ‘Long Term Incentive Plans, 
Executive Pay and UK Company Performance’, (2003) 40(7) Journal of Management Studies 1709. 
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short-term goals that form the basis of reward structures for executives i.e., that 
executives need to receive competitive and credible remuneration appropriate to their 
expertise, their value and general knowledge.76 
In Nigeria, LTIPs do not appear to be linked to directors’ performance; indeed it is not 
clear how they are applied. For one, there is relatively lower level of shareholder 
participation and so companies are left to their own devises and two, company directors 
prefer cash. A third reason is that companies may not have transparent long-term market 
performance targets which means there is effectively no yardstick on which to 
determine their long-term performance. The Nigerian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Code expressly states that the executive directors remuneration 
should also contain a component that is long-term performance-related and may include 
stock options and bonuses.77  This suggests that the practice of both LTIPs and STIPs 
is in existence in Nigeria and should be considered in the remuneration structure of 
companies even if it is not widely used. Yet, there is a problem. The Nigerian SEC 
creates a gap for directors to manage and make decisions in a company where they have 
nothing at stake in terms of equity interests. It goes further to state that even where 
stock options are part of the package, these options can only be exercisable one year 
after the directors’ departure.78What happens when a director retires within a year and 
sells his stock interest the following year?  Such an instance will defeat the very essence 
of stock options as LTIPs.   
                                      
76Demetra Arsalidou ‘The regulation of executive pay and economic theory’, (2011) 5 Journal of 
Business Law 431. 
77SEC Code 2011, para 5.3. 
78SEC Code 2011, para 14.4. 
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In sum, CG guidelines in the UK and Australia recommend that the LTIPs plan should 
include one or more performance hurdles. In Australia in particular, the Investment and 
Financial Services Association79 recommend that incentive plans whether long-term or 
short-term, should contain demanding hurdles. The performance requirements should 
provide incentives to directors which in effect will improve the overall performance of 
the company.80 The Nigerian approach on the other hand is not so clear.  
B. Short Term Incentive Plans (STIPs) 
Majority of STIPs are based on performance financial indices like operating income, 
earnings before interest and tax and profit after tax which are short term success 
indicators of company performance. In Australia, there is increasing scrutiny of the size 
of STIPs awards given to executives. 81 A research conducted by PWC in the financial 
year 2012, revealed that only 30 per cent of companies paid STIP awards or above 
targets awards, an improvement compared to the previous year when 38 per cent of 
ASX companies paid STIP awards. 82  
In the UK, the approach to STIPs is also performance and target based. Lamy and 
Goldin comment that business incentives have shifted to shorter-term focus as 
importance is attached more to market accounting, quarterly returns and short-term 
incentive or annual bonuses.83 STIPs usually being annual bonuses have been at the 
                                      
79Investment and Financial Services Association (IFSA) Executive Share and Option Scheme Guidelines 
(IFSA, Sydney, 2002) para 7.1. 
80G.P. Stapledon, ‘The Pay for Performance Dilemma’, (2004) 13 Griffith Law Review 57. 
81See generally, Graham O’Neill and Allan Berry, op cit (n65 above). 
82PWC, ’10 minutes on….Executive remuneration trends-a tweak and a tuck to get a tick’, (Australia, 
January 2013) available at http://www.pwc.com.au/consulting/assets/publications/Ten-Minutes-
Jan13.pdf accessed 9 February 2015. 
83Pascal Lamy and Ian Goldin, ‘Short-termism in business can perpetuate instability and risk’, The 
Telegraph (UK, 15th October, 2013) available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/10381558/Short-termism-in-business-can-perpetuate-
instability-and-risk.html accessed 9th February 2015. 
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core of criticisms on directors’ pay in the UK. An instance is that of the Co-op bank 
which announced losses and was still paying its executives bonuses; the Bank despite 
recovering from a scandal had plans to lay off up to 5,000 employees while making 
bonus pay-outs to senior staff.84 
In Nigeria the limitation of STIPs is seem more clearly where STIPs which are 
supposed to be performance-based distort performance as directors and executives use 
these STIPs to disguise excessive pay.85 Olisaemeka observes in this regard that the 
Nigeria Capital Market was not seen as a market for the long term but as a short term 
one because majority of the companies listed on it were chasing short term goals and 
rewarding their executive on STIPs.86 This opinion is supported by available 
information at least in the Nigerian media: STIPs are a significant if not a major 
component of remuneration packages in Nigeria.87 
C. Performance Related Incentives (PRIs) 
PRIs depict equity in compensation which means fairness and justice in pay.88  
Finkelstein and Hambrick contend that in practice, base salaries in many companies are 
very high and there is no need to resort to performance-related incentives which are 
                                      
84Jamie Doward, ‘New Co-op storm as board awards bosses huge pay and bonus deals’, The Guardian 
(UK, 8 March 2014) available at http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/mar/08/new-co-op-storm-
pay-deals accessed 9th February 2015. 
85Bryan Gould, ‘Executive bonus schemes do not work’, The Guardian (UK, 5th September 2009) 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/sep/05/executive-bonus-culture accessed 
9th February 2015. 
86A.G Olisaemeka, ‘The Meltdown of the Nigerian Capital Market: Causes and Consequences-
Investment’, Nairaland (Nigeria, 1st March 2009) available at 
http://www.nairaland.com/241080/meltdown-nigerian-capital-market-causes accessed 9th February 
2015. 
87Naij: ‘Top-8 Nigeria’s Highest Paid CEOs and Their Daily Income’, Naij (Nigeria, 22 November 2013) 
available at http://news.naij.com/52675.html accessed 9 February 2015. 
88C. Obisi, C.B.N. Uche and N.E. Ifekwem, ‘Employee Compensation Management in Nigerian 
Organisations: Some Observations and Agenda for Research’, (2003) 1(1) Swiss Journals of 
Management and Business Studies 23.  
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based on share returns, accounting profitability and bonus pays.89 Contrary to this view 
is the commonly held notion that for a company to be successful, it should link pay to 
performance, as pay is deemed essential in encouraging all round performance.90 Brown 
and Heywood argue that there is need to consider the importance of the economic, 
institutional and cultural background of countries in deciding performance related pay 
schemes or incentives.91 Janet Lee also notes that PRIs are not just related to the level 
of performance of the company but also relate to the change in performance and all of 
this relates to the ownership concentration, board structure and firm size.92 
In Australia, there has been a shift in executive pay following the US model, with a 
growing emphasis on short and LTI payments.93 The same can be said about the UK: 
companies tend to grant less share options to their executives leading to lower 
appreciation of LTIPs.94 In practice however it seems UK companies are more 
concerned with how much of an incentive should be awarded rather than whether a PRI 
payment has been earned in the first place.95 The result of this is that despite the 
incentive schemes, remuneration systems tend to sway towards the traditional fixed 
pay.96 In Nigeria, use of PRIs is again not clear. Ude and Coker recommend that if PRIs 
                                      
89S. Frinkelstein and D.C. Hambrick, ‘Chief Executive Compensation: A synthesis and reconciliation’, 
(1988) 9 Strategic Management Journal 543 
90See Richard J. Long and John L. Shields, ‘Performance pay in Canadian and Australian firms: a 
comparative study’, (2005) 16(10) International Journal of Human Resource Management 1783-1811. 
91See M. Brown and J. Heywood op cit, (n61 above) 261. 
92Janet Lee, ‘Executive performance-based remuneration, performance change and board structures’, 
(2009) 44(2) The International Journal of Accounting 138.  
93 Graham O’Neill and Allan Berry, (n 65 above). 
94 See Martin Conyon, Simon I. Peck and Graham Sadler, ‘Corporate Tournaments and Executive 
Compensation: Evidence from the UK’, (2001) 22(8) Strategic Management Journal 805-815. 
95Ibid.  
96Glennis Hanley and Loan Nguyen, ‘The Dash for Cash: Performance Related Pay-An Australian Union 
Perspective’. (2003) Working Paper 4/03 Monash University, available at 
http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/mgt/research/working-papers/2003/wp04-03.pdf accessed 9th 
February 2015. 
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are to be used, such PRIs must be identified, based on individual performance and the 
incentive must be feasible for the company to implement.97  
The Nigerian SEC Code requires that the remuneration policy of a company should 
explain how rewards of senior management and executives are linked to both corporate 
and individual performance.98 This provision may further embolden shareholder 
participation although the extent to which PRIs are included as part of compensation 
schemes is not always readily available from public records.99  
 
IV. DIRECTORS’ REMUNERATION AND REFORMS 
Payment made to directors derive from their contracts subject to the company’s Articles 
of Association. Benito and Conyon in a research into twenty-one UK companies’ 
directors’ remuneration policies between 1985 and 1994 following the Cadbury Report 
found that contrary to the assumption that company directors’ pay was arbitrary, 
                                      
97Ugwu Ude and M.A. Coker, ‘Incentive Schemes, Employee Motivation and Productivity in 
Organizations in Nigeria: Analytical Linkages’, (2012) 1(4) IOSR Journal of Business and Management 
32. 
98The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Code of Corporate Governance for Public 
Companies, 2011 available at 
http://www.sec.gov.ng/files/CODE%20OF%20CORPORATE%20GOVERNANCE%20FOR%20PUB
LIC%20COMPANIES.pdf accessed 9th February 2015. Hereinafter the SEC Code. See SEC Code, para 
14.1 (c). 
99Adewale Ajayi et al, ‘Nigeria: Post-Economic Crisis: Optimising Rewards For Business Performance’, 
Mondaq (Nigeria, 15 November 2012) available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/206188/employee+rights+labour+relations/PostEconomic+Crisis+Optimisi
ng+Rewards+For+Business+Performance accessed 9th February 2015. For our present purposes, we 
looked at the records of executive pay in  two public companies: PZ Cussons PLC- Annual Report and 
Accounts 2013, available at http://www.pzcussonsng.com/files/report-2013.pdf accessed 13th February 
2015 and; United Bank for Africa PLC Annual Report 2012 available at 
http://www.ubagroup.com/upload/docs/2012-annual-report-financial-
s_K8JAC_20130510113351kgapgbksff.pdf accessed 9 February 2015. 
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“directors’ compensation is positively related to pre-dated shareholder returns and 
company size with the quantitative effect of the latter dominating the former.”100  
Under UK law however, the director is an officer of the company and he or she has no 
right of remuneration unless the company's articles state so.101 The approach in 
Australia is not too different. Kym Sheehan points out that the regulatory framework 
for executive remuneration is not determined by the government, which means that 
there are no models like that of the UK.102 Remuneration practice is therefore gleaned 
from the remuneration contract, its execution and termination.103 The main source of 
the right a director has to remuneration is found in the company’s Articles and where 
there is no such clause, the alternative rule in the Australian Corporation Act provides 
that the director will be paid such remuneration and expenses as determined by the 
general meeting of the members.104 
The Nigerian approach is also similar to that in the UK and Australia and the 
remuneration agreed is essentially a contractual agreement between the company and 
the director with little or no input from the shareholders. The Nigerian Companies and 
Allied Matters Act (CAMA) does not define an executive director; they are treated as 
employees of the company although their service contract and compensation is 
                                      
100 See Andrew Benito and Martin Conyon, ‘The Governance of Directors’ Pay: Evidence from UK 
Companies’, (1999) 3(2) Journal of Management and Governance 117. 
101Director’s Service Contracts- Fixed Salary (without PILON) available at http://simply-
docs.co.uk/Directors_Service_Contracts/Director%E2%80%99s_Service_Contract_%E2%80%93_Fix
ed_Salary_no_PILON accessed 9th February 2015; See the early case of  Re Beeton & Co Ltd [1913] 2 
Ch 279. Director’s Service Contracts is also provided for in the Model Articles of Association. See the 
UK Companies Act (2006) Model Articles, Table A. 
102 See Kym Sheenan, ‘The Regulatory Framework for Executive Remuneration in Australia’, (2009) 
31(2) Sydney Law Review 273.  
103Ibid. 
104 See Roman Tomasic et al, Corporations Law in Australia, (2nd edition, Federation Press, 2002), 276. 
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addressed differently from that of employees.105 As decided by the court in Longe v 
First Bank of Nigeria Plc service contracts are regulated by the Articles of Association 
(AoA) of the company which have the effect of a binding contract.106  
A. Australian Reforms 
One of Australia’s responses to the crisis was to provide for a more transparent 
overview of executive compensation. The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority 
(APRA)107 was therefore set up to constitute a more intense form of government 
monitoring of executive pay than has been in existence previously.108 
Under the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act109 (the CLERP 9 Act) listed 
companies are required to include a separate remuneration report as part of their 
directors' report in the annual report of each company under the heading “Remuneration 
Report”; further disclosure requirements being imposed where the remuneration of a 
director or executive is dependent on the satisfaction of a performance condition, or 
includes equity-based compensation.110 There is a requirement for a non-binding 
(advisory) shareholder resolution to be put at a listed company's AGM that the 
remuneration report be adopted.”111 In the event of a contravention, the Australian 
                                      
105Delliote Corporate Services Limited (DCSL), ‘Retirement by Rotation and the Removal of Executive 
Directors’, (2013) 1(2) Governance Newsletter 1.  
106Longe v First Bank of Nigeria Plc (2006) 3 NWLR (Pt 967) 228. See  CAMA 2004, s 267(4) 
107The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 2009 implementing the FSB Principles  
108Jennifer G. Hill, Regulating executive remuneration after the global financial crisis: common law 
perspectives, in Randall Thomas and Jennifer Hill (eds) Research Handbook on Executive Pay, (Edward 
Elgar, 2012), 226. 
109Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act (the CLERP 9 Act), effective July 1, 2004. 
110 See Charles Rosedale and Soruban Rajakulendran, ‘Australia: Company Law- Corporate Governance 
(Legislative Comment)’, (2006) 17(5) International Company and Commercial Law Review N33 
111Ibid.  
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Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has the power to impose fines as high 
as $100,000.112 
Australian companies are now required to prepare remuneration reports in line with the 
applicable accounting standards.113In 2007, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) in 
the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practices, provided that 
directors’ remuneration should be sufficient and reasonable and should be related to 
corporate and individual performance.114 In 2013, the ASX proposed further 
recommendations on remuneration. Under these recommendations, companies that do 
not have remuneration committees should disclose that fact and also disclose what 
processes they have put in place in setting the remuneration level of directors and senior 
executives and must ensure that such remuneration is appropriate and not excessive.115 
Another reform created by the Federal Government of Australia on July 1, 2011 is the 
‘two-strikes’ law which was designed to hold directors accountable for salaries and 
bonuses of executives.116 The first strike occurs when the company’s remuneration 
report which gives detailed information on the individual director’s remuneration, 
receives a disapproval vote of 25 per cent or above by its members. The second strike 
occurs when a subsequent report of the company’s remuneration report also receives a 
                                      
112Ibid,  pg N34 
113Chapter 5,Overview of the regulatory and corporate governance framework. Online source available 
at http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/93598/08-chapter5.pdf accessed 6th April 2014. 
114Jean Jacques du Plessis, J.J. Du Plessis, MirkoBagaric and Anil Hargovan, Principles of Contemporary 
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115Company Law and Governance Update, ASX Corporate Governance Council consults on proposed 
3rd edition of the Principles and Recommendations (Ashurst, Australia, 28 August 2013) available at 
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278us.html accessed 9th February 2015; see also Reza Monem and Chew Ng, “Australia’s ‘two-strikes’ 
rule and the pay-performance link: Are shareholders judicious?” Journal of Contemporary Accounting 
and Economics Vol 9 Issue 2 (2012) 237-254. 
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25 per cent or more disapproval from its shareholders. Subsequently, there will be a 
‘spill meeting’ requiring persons who were directors at the time the disapproved 
remuneration report was considered to stand for re-election. The rationale behind this 
law according to the Australian government is to provide an additional level of 
accountability, disclosure and transparency in deciding and reporting remuneration of 
directors and executives.117 
B. UK Reforms 
The concerns of the UK on executive remuneration are: the size of the basic pay; the 
large gains and the compensation payments to directors on loss of office.118 These 
concerns had stimulated several reforms even before the 2008 crisis. In 1995, the 
Greenbury Committee was set up with the goal to “identify good practice in 
determining direct remuneration and prepare a Code of such practice for use by UK 
plcs.”119 Recommendations were made for the need of accountability, transparency and 
performance. The provisions were designed to ensure that directors’ remuneration is 
linked to individual performance.120 A later reform review, the Walker Review of 2009, 
gave recommendations on remuneration practices within financial institutions.121 Its 
aim was not to define the level of remuneration that should be awarded to directors 
                                      
117Georgia Wilkins, ibid. 
118James J. Hughes, ‘The Greenbury Report on Directors’ Remuneration’, (1996) 17(1) International 
Journal of Manpower 4. 
119Reference of the Study Group on Directors’ Remuneration chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury reported 
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rather it came up with proposals on how to improve the structure of remuneration in 
terms of risk taking and performance.122  
Present action to further strengthen transparency and accountability in directors’ 
remuneration for UK quoted companies include that the directors remuneration report 
should contain a statement by the remuneration committee, a clear indication of the 
companies’ remuneration policy, and information on how the remuneration policy has 
been implemented in the financial year being reported.123 The remuneration policy is 
subject to shareholder approval by a binding vote (resolution) at least once every three 
years under Section 439A of the UK Companies Act 2006.  
C. Nigerian Reforms 
The Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) provides that even where 
the Articles have fixed the remuneration of directors it can still be altered by the 
shareholders at the company’s general meeting.124 It states that where the directors 
receive remuneration not approved by the shareholders, they may be liable for 
misfeasance and will be accountable.125 Following the 2008 crisis, Nigeria set up 
committees to recommend best Corporate Governance practices suitable for its business 
environment. The Atedo Peterside Committee126 and the later M.B. Mahmoud 
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2015. 
124CAMA 2004, s267(3). 
125Ibid, s267(6). 
126Committee headed by Atedo Peterside (OON) mandated to identify weaknesses in current corporate 
governance practices in Nigeria. 
27 
 
committee127 have both come up with recommendations but have not focused on 
remuneration of directors.  
However the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) came up with a new Code of 
Corporate Governance for Public Companies in 2011. Unfortunately, the SEC Code’s 
provisions on directors’ remuneration are not detailed. 128 The SEC Code suggests that 
the level of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, motivate and retain skilled 
qualified persons needed to run the company successfully.129 It requires companies to 
come up with well-structured policies on remuneration not just for directors but also 
for senior management and to define the standards and mechanisms for determining the 
level of remuneration and describing how and to what extent this links to the corporate 
and individual performance.130 However, it does not lay down a structure for 
enforcement of the remuneration policy and proper detailed disclosure of individual 
directors’ and their itemised compensation packages. It does however state that the 
company’s remuneration policy and all material benefits paid to directors should be 
published in the company’s annual report.131  
A major problem here is that the SEC Code gives the directors and the remuneration 
committee powers to determine their own remuneration and not by the general meeting, 
as required by the CAMA.132 This means that the SEC Code is in conflict with the 
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CAMA.  In fact the CAMA supports pay according to performance, accountability and 
transparency even more than the SEC Code since the CAMA expressly states that the 
pay of directors must be apportionable133 or in other words assigned appropriately and 
scrutinized by the shareholders at the general meeting. 
There is also a Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) code134 which contains mandatory 
provisions that should be applied by the banks. As regards remuneration, it does not 
mention a policy or structure in deciding same. This allows bank executives to decide 
their packages thereby creating an avenue for abuse of shareholders’ funds.135 A 
promise that the Nigerian government through the CBN would step in to check the 
abuse of directors’ powers by introducing measures to regulate remuneration and 
bonuses of executive officers has so far not been put into action.136 
According to Kama and Chuku, management in Nigerian banks typically influence the 
selection process and determines who comes on the board.137  Management boards of 
companies have typically acted for the benefit of those who appoint them and this 
surrogacy function results in management merely rubber stamping the decisions of their 
benefactors.138Furthermore, the CBN has not made further efforts to prescribe 
disclosure requirements regarding directors’ remuneration. The CBN Governor’s 
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reason for this lack of action was that the issue of executive compensation in Nigeria 
was not at the heart or the principal cause of the financial crisis in Nigeria unlike other 
countries around the world and that comparison between the UK and Nigeria on the 
issue of remuneration is unfounded.139 
 
V. MEASURING PERFORMANCE FOR REMUNERATION PURPOSES 
The UK CG Code places importance on the relationship between company performance 
and executive pay and recognizes the value of performance evaluation in this context.140 
The Code states that there should be annual evaluation of the Board which will 
determine its.141 In addition, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) created a report 
on Board Effectiveness which aims to help companies have a better understanding on 
effective boards, performance and pay. Board evaluation is one of the three key issues 
that help make an effective board. The reason for this was stated by the ABI Director 
General Otto Thoresen: 
Effective boardrooms should be the powerhouse of the UK 
economy. The board effectiveness report and long standing 
remuneration guidelines represent UK best practice. They aim to 
ensure that remuneration is linked to performance and shareholders' 
interests are protected. We continue to favour evolution, building on 
what we have learnt from recent years to make sure companies act 
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in shareholder's interests and deliver long term economic growth 
that will benefit society as a whole.142 
Some suggest evaluation has an impact on remuneration.143 It is important to point out 
at this point that there is a dilemma here, one of time. Directors’ remuneration packages 
are usually agreed at the start of the financial year or prior to commencement of office; 
a subsequent appraisal may or may not highlight a failure or a potential crisis if the 
auditors do not testify to this. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether or not poor 
performance was due to “bad luck” or poor decisions.144 Following the failure of the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, a report of the same title, by the Financial Services Authority 
in 2011 noted as below: 
Errors of commercial judgement are not in themselves sanctionable unless 
either the processes and controls which governed how these judgements were 
reached were clearly deficient, or the judgements were clearly outside the 
bounds of what might be considered reasonable. The reasonableness of 
judgements, moreover, has to be assessed within the context of the information 
available at the time, and not with the benefit of hindsight.145 
In Australia, the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 
provides for the annual evaluation of the performance of the board and issues arising 
from the review.146 This suggests that the Australian approach is similar to that of the 
                                      
142Association of British Insurers, ‘UK boardrooms given clear guidance on executive pay and effective 
performance’, News releases (28 Sept 2011) available at https://www.abi.org.uk/News/News-
releases/2011/09/uk-boardrooms-given-clear-guidance-on-executive-pay-and-effective-
performance.aspx accessed 9th February 2015. 
143James Beck, ‘CEO performance reviews that work’, Effective Governance News (Australia, 12 August 
2013) available at <http://www.effectivegovernance.com.au/ceo-performance-reviews-that-work/> 
accessed 9th February 2015. 
144Richard Lambert and David Larcker ‘Executive Compensation, Corporate Decision Making’ in Fred 
K. Foulkes (ed) Executive Compensation: A Strategic Guide for the 1990s (Harvard Business Press, 
1999);  
145The Financial Services Authority Report into the RBS, page 9. 
146ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations 2014, recommendation1.6.Italics for 
emphasis. 
31 
 
UK. Under the Guidelines for Executive Remuneration contained in the ASX principles 
and recommendations, performance based remuneration which is a component of 
executive remuneration, should be linked to specified performance targets and the way 
this can be done is through proper board evaluation or appraisal.147 The ASX Principles 
and Recommendations in addition recommend that the company should introduce key 
performance indicators for executives’ measure of achievement of objectives and link 
part of it to their remuneration.148 
In Nigeria, the SEC Code recommends that the board of directors should establish a 
system to evaluate its own performance annually.149  From the Code, the purpose of any 
evaluation or appraisal is mainly for training and for purposes of determining re-
election.150  The CBN Code offers a more transparent provision: that banks should carry 
out a performance appraisal and this appraisal should be done by an outside consultant 
whose appointment and termination should be approved by the shareholders at an 
AGM.151 
It does not appear that at least at present, performance appraisal is accorded much 
importance in Nigerian companies. Where they are carried out, performance appraisals 
or evaluations are not conducted in relation to remuneration; they are conducted 
primarily on an evaluative basis and there is no further obligation on communicating 
the results of the appraisal to the shareholders.152 
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A. The Appeal of Audits and Disclosure Requirements 
Certain factors can impact the performance of the directors. These include the board of 
directors,153 as the size of the board increases, the pay of the executives also increase.154  
Unless there is sufficient independence and competence on the board itself, the 
company may suffer and reward for its executives will be provided regardless.155 The 
size of the company also matters as corporation size can be a partial representation of 
managerial ability.156 
In our view, audit reports and disclosure requirements present a good means of 
measuring performance. In Australia, it has been recommended that reports on 
incentive measures must reflect the risks inherent in these measures as well.157 On this 
basis, the ASIC has reiterated the need to ensure that risk reporting which is done 
through the audit committee remains of high quality.158In the UK, the Committee on 
Internal Audit recommended that the audit of a company should include risk and 
whether appraisal and remuneration processes are in line with values, ethics, risk 
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appetite and overall policies of the company.159 Australia and the UK have thus 
established a direct link between the audit committee and executive compensation.   
In Nigeria the audit committees are more focused on the financial performance of the 
company as a whole, and not the performance of the board.160 However, audit reports 
may impact remuneration in future, because if the company is not doing well and this 
is publicly disclosed in the audited accounts, excessive rewards for directors can be 
countered on available evidence. 
With regard to disclosure, in practice, shareholders, the media and the general public 
can only rely on what is reported or disclosed. Contrary to the intended aims, it can 
argued that increased disclosure can cause problems. Greater disclosure can mean the 
greater likelihood of executives comparing their remuneration with those of others 
which can only serve to inflate remuneration generally.161 On the other hand, executives 
may not be keen to let the public know just how much they earn as directors.  
The Australian Corporations Act lays down requirements on the specific information 
companies must disclose on their remuneration.162 There is a further requirement that 
time be allocated to discussing remuneration of executives at the general meeting which 
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will be voted on by the shareholder.163 In Nigeria, the CAMA has mandatory provisions 
regarding proper disclosure.164 Audit committees are charged with ensuring that there 
is proper compliance with disclosure requirements relating to the remuneration of 
executives and the highly paid staff of the company.165 This provision has not made 
much impact and for banks in particular, the lack of transparency and disclosure of 
financial transactions has led to increased financial crimes.166  
Furthermore, the contradictory approaches of the national law under CAMA and the 
bank (CBN) and market Codes (SEC) in Nigeria, do not help. Since the CAMA does 
not appear to have strong enforcement mechanism and poor regulatory oversight, 
executives can deliberately refuse to properly disclose certain information required by 
the Nigerian Accounting Standard Board.167 According to Nat Ofo, the deficiencies in 
the Nigerian SEC Code also contribute to this. The SEC Code does not demand full 
disclosure of the remuneration and breakdown of executive remuneration. This is a 
loophole that creates an avenue for poor monitoring of the boards’ activities.168 The 
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provisions on disclosure of remuneration recommend that the company’s interests are 
put before private interest.169 Ejuvbekpokpo and Esuike recommend that in the absence 
of strong political and institutional framework, disclosure must be compulsory and 
compliance enforced if it is to be of any effect.170 
The growing Nigerian market requires even stronger models of transparency and 
accountability. Disclosure of company accounts, appropriate, accessible and accurate 
information on relevant company matters as required by the CAMA and disclosure of 
directors remuneration, serve to alert shareholders and the wider public on company 
performance. These ultimately provide a yardstick to evaluate if only on a broad basis, 
the contribution directors make to the company in justification of their pay. Timely 
disclosure is also very important in the Nigerian context; much of the information on 
vital issues are reported in the media and accessed via media networks – they may not 
be recorded in academic or research material. It becomes even more difficult to access 
information when it is not provided and discussed at the time there is public interest in 
receiving same.  
It is important to bear in mind that the environment and business culture also matters 
when considering directors’ performance. The business environments in the UK and 
Australia differ significantly from Nigeria. According to Fajana et al, effective 
management in Nigeria cannot be divorced from the local values, customs, and the 
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overall external cultural environment.171 This means that company executives still have 
to find ways around social challenges such as poor infrastructure, bureaucracy and 
limited regulation, single ownership and family control of boards, and the limited 
regulatory and enforcement oversight of corporate activity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Australia is in our view the most progressive of the three jurisdictions with respect to 
efficient corporate governance action over directors’ pay. There is a mandatory tone to 
its executive remuneration provisions and disclosure of directors’ remuneration is 
prioritized. The UK for its part is gradually moving towards granting shareholders more 
power in deciding executives’ pay although time will tell what shareholders will make 
of the authority given to them. Intervention is still political it is either when a company 
has failed or is on the brink of failure, that CEOs are summoned before the House of 
Parliament. This approach is not sufficient since the intervention comes after the deed 
has been done and the executives can come up with a proper justification for their 
reward.  A preventive approach will be more appropriate that is, regulatory provisions 
that asks questions where there is evidence of poor performance for example in audited 
corporate accounts for each financial year.  
The major problem we found in examining practice in Nigeria was the lack of strong 
institutional infrastructure on corporate governance. However since the global efforts 
at recovery from the 2008 crisis and with a return to democracy, greater media and 
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public scrutiny has ensured that there is growing awareness about company executives’ 
responsibility to work for their huge pay. Intervention has been limited to the actions 
of the Central Bank as previously discussed and corporate directors have not been 
reprimanded on the grounds of excessive remuneration, but for fraud and similar 
crimes.172 
Regardless of the level of corporate activity in a jurisdiction, strategies taking into 
account the reward for performance given to directors, is imperative to sustain 
confidence in the market. It is also vital for the maintenance of transparency and 
accountability in the corporate sector. For emerging economies like Nigeria in 
particular, more efficient corporate governance processes including stronger regulatory 
oversight over directors’ pay and performance can strengthen investment and efficiency 
in the corporate sector.  
 
                                      
172This is under the authority of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Nigeria. The 
Commission publishes details of its investigations and arrests on its web site: 
https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/. 
